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<span id="openzim-page-title" class="mw-page-title-main"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Precommitment</span></span>

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</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">For the concept in cryptography, see <a href="Commitment_scheme" title="Commitment scheme">commitment scheme</a>. For the campaign to reduce self-harm by gamblers, see <a href="Andrew_Wilkie" title="Andrew Wilkie">Andrew Wilkie</a>.</div><p>In <a href="Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a>, <b>precommitment</b> is a strategy or a method of <a href="Self-control" title="Self-control">self-control</a> that a person or organisation may use to restrict the number of <a href="Choice" title="Choice">choices</a> available to them at a future time.<sup id="cite_ref-:2_1-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:2-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Precommitment may also involve imposing obstacles or additional costs to certain courses of action in advance. <a href="Agency_(psychology)" title="Agency (psychology)">Agents</a> may precommit themselves when they predict that their preferences will change but wish to ensure that their future actions will align with their current preferences.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_2-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Precommitment has been studied as a <a href="Negotiation" title="Negotiation">bargaining</a> strategy in which agents bind themselves to one course of action in order to enhance the credibility of present threats. Some scholars have proposed that <a href="Collective_action" title="Collective action">collective</a> political groups may also engage in precommitment by adopting <a href="Constitution" title="Constitution">constitutions</a> that limit the scope of future legislation.<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Background">Background</h2></div>

<p>In two unrelated articles, both published in 1956, <a href="Thomas_Schelling" title="Thomas Schelling">Thomas Schelling</a> and <a href="Robert_H._Strotz" title="Robert H. Strotz">R.H. Strotz</a> introduced the concept of precommitment to the study of strategic bargaining and <a href="Consumer_behaviour" title="Consumer behaviour">consumer behavior</a>, respectively. Schelling later included an expanded version of this essay in his 1960 work <i>The Strategy of Conflict</i>,<sup id="cite_ref-:0_4-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:0-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> explaining precommitment as part of his <a href="Deterrence_theory" title="Deterrence theory">deterrence theory</a>, where it is said to influence other parties in a bargaining situation.<sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> He detailed that a party can exert <a href="Bargaining_power" title="Bargaining power">power</a> over another or achieve more of his aims by adopting rules that restrict available options.<sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Schelling argued that a negotiator may voluntarily limit the options available to them in the future in order to make his current offer or threat more credible. This can also be achieved by voluntarily raising the cost of a future action for oneself, even if that action is not precluded absolutely.<sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> For example, a general may burn the bridges behind his army to preclude the possibility of <a href="Retreat_(military)" class="mw-redirect" title="Retreat (military)">retreat</a>, thereby increasing the credibility of his threat to stand and fight.<sup id="cite_ref-:0_4-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:0-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Unlike Schelling, Strotz was not concerned with the uses of precommitment in bargaining situations. Rather, for Strotz, precommitment was a strategy which an agent might use to impose his current intentions upon a myopic future self. In the epigraph to his article on the subject, Strotz connects his theory of precommitment to the story of <a href="Siren_(mythology)#Odyssey" title="Siren (mythology)">Ulysses and the Sirens</a> from <i><a href="The_Odyssey" class="mw-redirect" title="The Odyssey">The Odyssey</a></i>.<sup id="cite_ref-8" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-8"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>8<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Elster's_theory">Elster's theory</h2></div>

<p><a href="Jon_Elster" title="Jon Elster">Jon Elster</a> first developed a theory of precommitment, which he also calls self-binding, in his 1979 work <i>Ulysses and the Sirens.</i> Here, he argues that precommitment is a device that human agents use to overcome the problem of imperfect rationality: Human beings are imperfectly rational because they are capable of rational planning but are prone to deviate from these plans because of weakness of will. Recognizing their vulnerability to imperious passions, human agents precommit themselves to "[achieve] rationality by indirect means."

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Elaborating upon Strotz's reference to <i>The</i> <i>Odyssey</i>, Elster takes the story of Ulysses and the Sirens to be a paradigmatic case of precommitment, referring to precommitment as "the Ulysses problem." On the basis of a warning from his erstwhile lover <a href="Circe" title="Circe">Circe</a>, Ulysses instructs his sailors to bind him to the mast of his ship and block their own ears before sailing past the island of the Sirens, whose enchanting song draws sailors to shipwreck.<sup id="cite_ref-:2_1-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:2-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Thus, foreseeing his own weakness of will, Ulysses guards against the temptation of the Sirens. A more mundane example that Elster uses is that of a smoker who tells her friends about her intention to <a href="Smoking_cessation" title="Smoking cessation">quit</a> in order to raise the cost of <a href="Relapse" title="Relapse">backsliding</a>. Having broadcast her intention to quit, a return to cigarettes would now damage her reputation or, at least, induce snide remarks from her friends. </p> <blockquote></blockquote><p>In <i>Ulysses and the Sirens,</i> Elster also applies his theory of precommitment to the domain of politics. Elster starts with the assertion that a <a href="Direct_democracy" title="Direct democracy">direct democracy</a> will tend to reverse its own decisions and to display inconsistent preferences over time. On this basis, Elster goes on to argue that certain institutions in modern democracies may be considered precommitment devices. A democratic electorate may bind itself as a way of "protecting itself against its own impulsiveness." The establishment of <a href="Central_bank" title="Central bank">central banks</a>, he argues, can be interpreted as an act of precommitment on the part of an electorate seeking to preempt the impulse to meddle with interest rates. Elster argues that a people may similarly bind itself through a constitution that entrusts certain powers to the <a href="Judiciary" title="Judiciary">judiciary</a> and requires <a href="Supermajority" title="Supermajority">supermajorities</a> to change certain clauses. By doing so, the people guards itself against its own irrationality at a future time. This, Elster says, is "the Ulysses strategy" in domain of politics.

</p><p>Elster elaborates upon his theory of precommitment in his 2000 work <i>Ulysses Unbound.</i> Here, he develops a typology of individual precommitment strategies, drawing on examples from <a href="French_literature" title="French literature">French literature</a> and from contemporary studies of <a href="Addiction" title="Addiction">addiction</a>. In the second part of this work, Elster partially repudiates his earlier application of precommitment to the domain of politics. He argues here that constitutions are often devised with the goal of binding others (e.g. future majorities), not their makers.<sup id="cite_ref-:1_2-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:1-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<ul><li><a href="Commitment_device" title="Commitment device">Commitment device</a></li>

<li><a href="The_Fox_and_the_Grapes" title="The Fox and the Grapes">Sour Grapes</a></li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2></div>

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</style><cite id="CITEREFSilva2016" class="citation book cs1">Silva, Sara Graça Da (2016). <i>Morality and Emotion</i>. Oxon: Routledge. p. 45. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-1-138-12130-0</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-:1-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:1_2-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:1_2-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFElster2000" class="citation book cs1">Elster, Jon (2000). <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/ulyssesunboundst0000elst/page/1"><i>Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints</i></a></span>. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/ulyssesunboundst0000elst/page/1">1–7.</a> <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>0521665612</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">e.g. Stephen Holmes, "Precommitment and the paradox of democracy," in <i>Constitutionalism and Democracy</i>, eds. John Elster and Rune Slagstad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 195-240.</span>

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<li id="cite_note-:0-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:0_4-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0_4-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSchelling1960" class="citation book cs1">Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). <i>The Strategy of Conflict</i>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. <span class="nowrap">21–</span>52. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>0-674-84030-5</bdi>.</cite> <span class="cs1-hidden-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">{{cite book}}</code>: </span><span class="cs1-hidden-error citation-comment">ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)</span></span>

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<li id="cite_note-5"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-5">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBrake2012" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Elizabeth_Brake" title="Elizabeth Brake">Brake, Elizabeth</a> (2012). <i><a href="Minimizing_Marriage%3A_Marriage%2C_Morality%2C_and_the_Law" class="mw-redirect" title="Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law">Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law</a></i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA. p. 57. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-19-977414-2</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFElsterSlagstadHernes1988" class="citation book cs1">Elster, Jon; Slagstad, Rune; Hernes, Gudmund (1988). <i>Constitutionalism and Democracy</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 236. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>0-521-34530-8</bdi>.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSchelling1956" class="citation journal cs1">Schelling, Thomas C. (June 1956). "An Essay on Bargaining". <i>The American Economic Review</i>. <b>46</b> (3): <span class="nowrap">281–</span>306.</cite></span>

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<li id="cite_note-8"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFStrotz1955–1956" class="citation journal cs1">Strotz, R. H. (1955–1956). "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization". <i>The Review of Economic Studies</i>. <b>23</b> (3): <span class="nowrap">165–</span>180. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2295722">10.2307/2295722</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2295722">2295722</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:154324774">154324774</a>.</cite></span>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Further_reading">Further reading</h2></div>

<ul><li><cite id="CITEREFKurth-NelsonRedish2012" class="citation journal cs1">Kurth-Nelson, Zeb; Redish, A. David (2012). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3465853">"Don't Let Me Do That! – Models of Precommitment"</a>. <i>Frontiers in Neuroscience</i>. <b>6</b>. Frontiers Media SA: 138. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.3389%2Ffnins.2012.00138">10.3389/fnins.2012.00138</a></span>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1662-4548">1662-4548</a>. <a href="PMC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMC (identifier)">PMC</a> <span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3465853">3465853</a></span>. <a href="PMID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="PMID (identifier)">PMID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23060739">23060739</a>.</cite></li></ul></div><div><div class="zim-footer">

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